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Recent Books 
Book Review 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS, By Roberto Mangabeira Unger. New 
York: The Free Press. 1975. Pp. ix, 336. $12.95. 
I. 
When the conjunction of two abstract nouns forms the title of 
a philosophical book, the book's thesis can often be summarized by 
changing conjunction to copula. For Professor Unger, knowledge 
is politics: solutions to the_basic problem of epistemology-what can 
we know?-presuppose and in turn are presupposed by solutions to 
the basic problem of political theory-_ how ought society to be organ-
ized? Critical appraisals of proposed or received doctrine in either 
of these areas that ignore the reciprocal implications for and of the 
other are doomed to remain but partial critiques. Unger's goal, in 
contrast, is "total criticism," by which one should perhaps understand, 
not that the analysis proceeds without presuppositions, but only that 
it proceeds with the conscious aim of doing what has just been indi-
cated: reducing to as few categories as possible the connections be-
tween current modes of thought about both what can be known and 
how society should be organized. The result is a description of 
received visions in each area that Unger finds defective in similar 
respects and for similar reasons: both visions share a small set of 
related and analogously faulty premises. 
The faulty premises derive primarily from doctrines espoused by 
Hobbes and, in varying degree, by Locke, Bentham, and other con-
tributers to classical, seventeenth century liberal thought. These 
doctrines, Unger suggests, point to moral arbitrariness in ethics and 
to overriding concern for the individual in the organization of society. 
Moral arbitrariness results because liberal "psychological" premises 
(the knowledge half of the inquiry, which includes for Unger both 
ethics and epistemology) assert that reason and desire are separate 
and that a whole is simply the sum of its parts. Reason thus cannot 
choose among ends, which are the dictates of random individual de-
sire, but can perform only the instrumental role of choosing means 
most likely to further such ends. The principle of individualism 
guides the organization of society because parallel premises of liberal 
political thought assert that values are subjective and that the attri-
butes of a group are reducible to the attributes of its members. Thus 
the State's only role is to restrain the "mutual antagonism" that re-
sults .from the struggle to satisfy individual wants. 
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A critique of these "liberal" premises, as of the premises of any 
theory, may proceed either from within, through a demonstration of 
internal inconsistency, or from without, by showing that the theory 
inadequately accounts for experience. Unger's critique does both. 
The postulates of liberal thought, he argues, lead to "antinomies" 
or conflicts among "conclusions derived from the same or from 
equally plausible premises."1 The "antinomy of reason and desire," 
for example, arises because the premises of liberal psychology lead 
to two equally untenable moral theories: a morality of reason and 
a morality of desire. The former, of which Kant's theory is an ex-
ample, supplies all that reason can in the way of moral guidance 
given the premise of arbitrary desire: it provides principles capable 
of commanding universal assent from individuals with disparate ends 
only because the principles are so abstract that they provide no guid-
ance in real cases. Kant's categorical imperative, the Golden Rule, 
the familiar "treat like cases alike" are all examples: they are 
empty formal directives, useless in the critical judgmental operation 
of determining "relevant" similarities and differences among the dis-
tinct objects of experience. 
The morality of desire ( which includes, for example, utilitarian 
theories that direct one to "maximize satisfactions") fares even 
worse. It is hardly a morality at all, but only "an inadequate descrip-
tive psychology" (p. 52), toting up and comparing desires as given 
with nothing to say to the individual who wants to know what he 
should desire. Moreover, viewed as a moral doctrine, Unger finds 
it inadequate: it points to a life in which contentment, defined as 
the satisfaction of desire, can never be achieved because desire never 
ceases. Thus "two equally untenable and [conflicting] moral doc-
trines seem to follow from the postulates of liberal psychology" 
(p. 54). 
In Unger's view, what gives rise to such antinomies is "the more 
fundamental problem of the universal and the particular." We can 
make sense of our ideas in science, morals, and politics, Unger 
claims, only by distinguishing between a universal element and a par-
ticular element: between theory and fact in science; between reason 
and desire in ethics; between rules and the values rules serve in poli-
tics. But this separation, though necessary, is impossible to uphold: 
Whenever we think of [the universal] as independent from [the 
particular], we end by recognizing their interdependence. Whenever 
we start by conceiving them as interdependent, we are forced to the 
conclusion that they must be independent. [p. 137] 
The primary aspects of experience ·that liberal thought subverts 
are the conception of self or personality and the idea of community. 
1. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND Pouncs 13 (1975) (hereinafter cited in the text 
by page number only). 
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On the one hand, the morality of desire projects a portrait of the 
self as an unconnected sequence of arbitrary, changing desires, hav-
ing nothing necessarily in common with the same self over time or 
with the rest of mankind. It thus denies both "the continuity and 
the humanity of the self'' (p. 57). The morality of reason, on the 
other hand, whose formal, indeterminate laws ignore individual striv-
ings, has an opposite and equally unhappy consequence: negation 
of the self's "capacity for moral innovation and its individual identity" 
(,p. 57). On the social level, these consequences are reflected in the 
schizophrenic flight of the individual, first to the demands of public 
role and convention (the political analogue to formal reason, which 
leads to submission or resignation), then back to the inclinations of 
private life (the analogue to arbitrary desire, which leads to disinte-
gration of the sense of unity with others). "To suffer at the same 
time from resignation and disintegration has become the ordinary cir-
cumstance of the moral life" (p. 62). 
What is the way out?· Why suppose, for that matter, that there 
is a way out? The predicament, after all, is an old one, as familiar 
in the history of philosophy as are most of Unger's arguments. The 
predicament may be described, as Unger chooses to describe it, in 
terms that point to the riddle of the relationship between the par-
ticular and the universal. It may also be described in less metaphysi-
cal terms as arising out of the limits of human ability to find authority 
or certainty in science or morals. If science could accept the view 
that things have intelligible, knowable essences, one would not have 
to be content with the relativity of definition and theory to purpose. 
If values were objective and knowable, moral disagreement would 
diminish as knowledge increases. In either case, if "God" would 
"speak," as Unger pleads at the end of his book (p. 295), the quest 
for authority could end. But Unger's plea, while it points to one 
particular path that the quest for certainty often takes, also points 
to the intell~tual's despair over finding or accepting such a path 
himself. 
All of these possibilities for finding authority depend, in short, 
on hypotheses modem man is unable to accept. Unger's book may 
be viewed as an invitation to take another look at the "unacceptable" 
hypotheses in the hope of finding at least one point sufficiently open 
to doubt to justify an attempt at intellectual revision. Such revision, 
Unger concedes, cannot take the form of outright denial of any of 
the premises of liberal psychology. One cannot simply assert that 
things have intelligible essences or that values are objective or that 
God has spoken. No such "philosopher's trick" (p. 17) can hope to 
affect the social experience of moral disagreement, scientific uncer-
tainty, and unrevealed divine truth that gives such force to the postu-
lates of liberal thought. One must start instead on a smaller scale, 
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revising liberal premises not in toto, but only as they apply to one 
particular phenomenon in the world: man himself. 
In metaphysical terms, Unger, with a bow to Hegel, 2 proposes 
to solve the problem of the relationship between the universal and 
the particular that underlies the antinomies by viewing persons as 
"concrete universals." Unger's claim that this notion is easier to 
understand or accept than an outright denial of one or more of the 
liberal postulates rests on his suggestion that persistent aspects of ex-
perience, despite the pervasive influence of liberalism, support such 
a "foreign" way of thinking. Moral experience confirms that con-
crete examples (as in the case of parables) contain general lessons 
that cannot be reduced to abstract rules. Works of art convey uni-
versal meaning that cannot, however, be abstracted from the particu-
lar work itself. Finally, the Christian dogmas of the incarnation and 
the resurrection illustrate a view of the relationship between infinite 
and finite quite different from the view of the relationship between 
universal and particular that underlies the antinomies of liberal 
thought (see pp. 143-44). 
This is not to say that one must accept Christian dogma in order 
to accept Unger's invitation. Unger is not attempting to persuade 
one of the existence of a heavenly kingdom, but of the possibility of 
establishing a kingdom of man on earth that significantly improves 
on the only kingdom that Unger believes liberalism is capable of sup-
porting. Like Marx and Weber, Unger is sensitive to the connection 
between theoretical doctrine and social experience and to the diffi-
culty of meaningfully altering the one without simultaneously altering 
the other. His aim in the first half of the book is to discover aspects 
of present experience capable of evoking the reader's empathy for 
both the critical analysis of liberalism and an alternative view of _man 
and society. This alternative view seeks conditions that will allow 
fuller realization of both man's individual or "concrete self' and 
his sociable or "abstract self' (pp. 222-26). It is a view that re-
jects both extreme individualism (under which community collapses) 
2. Id. at 312 n.24. Parallels to the structure and substance of Hegel's thought 
may be found throughout Unger's book. In particular, both emphasize the synthesis 
of opposing intellectual ideas through a movement: that occurs between stages of so-
ciety and emerging conceptions of value and truth; that leads to an increasing realiza-
tion in history of the value of freedom; and that is motivated by the struggle to 
realize in history an ideal that is expressed in the idea of God. The most significant 
difference between Unger's theory and Hegel's (or Marx's) is that Unger makes no 
claim that the process is in any sense inevitable or likely (even in theory) to succeed. 
This difference between the theories of Unger and Hegel leads Unger to resist 
strongly attempts to characterize his work as Hegelian. See exchange of corre-
spondence between Professor Unger and Professor Kronman, 61 MINN. L. REV. 200 
(1976) (commenting on Kronman's review of Knowledge and Politics). Unger ad-
mits that his position shares with Hegel's a "background of Christianity"; however; 
by insisting on the earthly unattainability of the ideal, Unger's work is "Christian" 
in a way that Hegel's is not. "The effort to participate in the dialogue between 
Christianity and modernism is one of the ruling ambitions of the work." Unger, 61 
MINN. L. REv. at 200, 203. 
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and extreme collectivism (under which self disappears). In place 
of these extremes, Unger seeks a synthesis and sense of social union 
similar to that discussed in a recent work by John Rawls, 3 who, it 
should be noted, starts from quite different, "liberal" premises. The 
guiding idea, which Rawls suggests "is surely implicit in numerous 
writings,"4 is that individuals in an ideal community will come to ac-
cept and sympathetically share in community choices different from 
the individual's own because community ends will increasingly re-
flect the individual's "species nature." At the same time, preserva-
tion of individual freedom to participate in the selection of ends and 
to develop particular talents and roles will facilitate continual com-
munity revision of its view of the nature of the "species," thus allow-
ing for individual variation and species development in a manner 
reminiscent of the urgings of no less a liberal than J. S. Mill.5 
Thus the stage is set for a transition from the critical argument 
to the construction of Unger's positive program. The assumptions 
of the program are boldly stated: ( 1) there is a unitary human 
nature, not in the form of an eternal "essence" revealed by reason, 
but in a form capable of developing and changing as man makes 
choices through history; (2) this nature will be revealed by common 
choices maintained over time in societies, assuming that such socie-
ties are free of domination and thus do not work a corrupting influ-
ence on the "shared values"; (3) the development of man's potential 
-the talents, the skills, the ends revealed by these shared values-
is the good. "Evaluation and description meet at the point at which 
one defines human nature" (p. 196). 
The implications of this alternative view are developed with care 
and insight in the final chapters of the book. These chapters con-
nect Unger's "Theory of the Self' ( ch. 5) with his examination of 
the society ( "The Theory of Organic Groups" ( ch. 6) ) that must exist 
in order to provide the domination-free conditions under which the 
ideal self can develop. Chapter four ("The Theory of the Welfare-
Corporate State") lays the groundwork for both analyses by examin-
ing the respects in which existing states fail to meet the "domination-
free" qualification. The post-feudal liberal state, whose "master 
institution," the bureaucracy, ideally tries to allocate social place ac-
cording to role, fails to meet the qualification because the principle 
of role appeals to a standard of merit, and "merit" is inevitably influ-
enced in the liberal state by class. Moreover, even if the welfare-
corporate state ( or, for that matter, the socialist state) could succeed 
in dispensing with the influence of class by assigning place solely on 
the basis of merit, "the exercise of power by the higher talents over 
3. See J. RAWLS, A TuEORY OF JUSTICE 520-30 (1971). 
4. Id. at 523 n.4. 
5. See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 100-33 (ch. III) (London 1859). 
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the less gifted becomes simply another form of personal domination 
unless a moral standard can be found to justify and limit it" (p. 173). 
Escape from domination in the meritocratic bureaucracy is possible, 
Unger argues, only if two conditions can be met: (1) members of 
the institution must participate "equally and continuously in the 
formulation of common ends" (the condition of democracy) (p. 183); 
(2) social relations must be "based on shared purposes whose moral 
authority is recognized and in which men view and treat one another 
as concrete and complete beings" (the condition of community) 
(p. 184). 
What would a society that fulfilled these conditions look like? 
Unger provides a speculative glimpse in his final chapter. The 
features that emerge can be briefly listed, but cannot be appreciated 
or fairly evaluated except in the context of the sustained argument 
that leads to them. Much of the discussion at this point draws on 
familiar sociological themes. Increased sympathy, for example, re-
quires in Unger's view the same "intimate face-to-face association 
and cooperation" found in such "primary groups" as the family. 0 
But, as others have observed, such primary groups cannot foster the 
sense of community as long as they remain "detached from positions 
of functi~nal relevance to the larger economic and political decisions 
of our society."7 Thus Unger suggests that one must seek face-to-
face association within groups that are organized to deal with the 
broad economic and political decisions affecting members of the 
group. The closest example of such a community is the emerging 
occupational group, united at first only by the production goals of 
the working place, but capable of becoming a "community of life" 
through the provision of joint facilities for housing, health care, edu-
cation and recreation (pp. 264-65). Drawing on the literature of 
alienation from Marx to Durkheim, Unger suggests that within such 
groups the division of labor must leave room for individual choice 
and experimentation, encouraging people to see and treat each other 
"as concrete individuals rather than as role occupants" (p. 261). 
With this in mind, the salient features of the positive program 
may be briefly summarized. They include: (1) "organic" groups, 
faced with a broad range of life situations, but small enough to allow 
face-to-face dealings among all of the members; (-2) a basic freedom 
on the part of individuals to join and leave such groups; (3) 
diminished importance of talent, with any assignment of roles by 
merit representing a political, collective choice, rather than a techni-
cal given; (4) distribution of benefits according to a standard that 
combines merit and need, with "basic needs" to be satisfied inde-
pendently of capacity or effort; (5) flexible division of labor, with 
6. See C.H. COOLEY, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 23-38 (1909). 
7. R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 54 (1953). 
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' less emphasis on specialization and greater room for individual ex-
perimentation and choice, including, for example, rotation of tasks 
and the sharing of indispensable but "generally abhorred" tasks as 
a "common burden" (p. 275). 
II. 
Those accustomed to evaluating argument and analysis by the 
standards of professional philosophy will find much to criticize in 
Unger's book. How, for example, can one categorize Kant with 
Hobbes as thinkers equally responsible for doctrines suggesting that 
values are subjective and arbitrary? It was, after all, precisely the 
attack of British empiricism on the basis for belief in the authority 
of science and morals that led Kant out of his "dogmatic slumbers" 
to the formulation of a theory designed to justify such beliefs. How, 
for that matter, can one in a few pages dismiss all varieties of utili-
tarianism as inadequate "moralities of desire" on the basis of argu-
ments that are at least as old as Plato8 and that few professional 
philosophers would accept as conclusive, much less self-evident? 
Not all consequentialist ethical theories require the naive calculus of 
the way to "contentment" that Unger seems to take as the model 
for his attack. Moreover, the claim that liberal psychology condemns 
reason to a purely instrumental role with nothing to say about the 
choice of ends would be dismissed by some as either trivially true 
or false. One can reason about ends more or less likely to produce 
happiness (perhaps by reference to those same aspects of human 
nature that Unger describes), even though the proof that happiness 
itself is the ultimate end rests, like all first principles, beyond the reach 
of reason. 
These reactions, however, can result only from a failure to 
appreciate Unger's objective. Knowledge and Politics is not an ex-
ercise in the history of philosophy or a commentary on or analysis 
of any particular philosopher or philosophical theory.9 Unger is 
8. See PLATO, GoRGIAS (B. Radice & R. Baldick eds. 1960). 
9. In this respect, the exchange of correspondence between Professors Unger and 
Kronman, published with the latter's review of Unger's book, see note 2 supra, is 
puzzling. In his review Kronman criticizes in some detail Unger's tendency to ignore 
or to treat superficially the responses philosophers have given to many of the prob-
lems Unger discusses. It seems to me that Unger's only defense to such criticism, 
as well as to the charge that he "treats too cavalierly, and at times positively misrep-
resents, the views of classical liberal thinkers," Kronman, 61 MINN. L. REV. at 205, is 
his repeated insistence that he is painting his own picture in Knowledge and Politics, 
rather than describing the views of any particular philosopher or rehearsing familiar-
and endless--"partial" philosophical debates. See KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 8-11, 
106, 118-19. See also id. at 293-94 (on the limits of philosophy). In the exchange 
with Kronman, however, Unger defends himself as if what is at stake is the precise 
relationship of his work with that of other philosophers. The Kronman-Unger ex-
change is dominated by disputes over whether Hegel is or is not Spinozist, whether 
Unger is or is not Hegelian, and whether Unger's book is or is not "Christian." It is 
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painting a picture-a metaphor to which he explicitly resorts (see 
pp. 14-15)-of the chief elements in the thought and consciousness 
of modern man. He identifies elements that typify the basic style 
of the post-seventeenth century era, much as one might identify 
Baroque style in art without analyzing in detail the variations among 
particular paintings or artists (cf. p. 122). He invites the reader to 
look and see and to compare with his or her own experience the 
portrait that results. The fact ¢.at the themes and arguments are 
familiar becomes a basis less for criticism than for conviction that 
the portrait is accurate. 
On this level, Unger's critique of Kant, and of theories of justice 
based on Kant, should strike a responsive chord in anyone who has 
tried to apply such theories to practical problems requiring hard 
moral or social choices. As for utilitarianism, while Unger does not 
pause to make the same detailed critique of such theories that one 
can find, for example, in Rawls10 or Nozick, 11 he weaves his own 
version of such critique~ into an account of the causes of moral 
skepticism and uncertainty under liberal postulates. Again the re-
sulting tapestry is recognizable. Modern welfare economics, reject-
ing the relevance of a calculus that might select the choices that an 
individual ought to prefer, or despairing of its ability to perform such 
a calculus, simply accepts preference curves as given. And to sug-
gest that a prescription to "maximize happiness" can be conceived 
broadly enough to include even Unger's theory of human nature as 
the good is to make the prescription superfluous. Aristotle too 
thought happiness the ultimate end of man. But that became for 
him only the starting point for an analysis of human potentiality bear-
ing close affinity in spirit to Unger's theory. Unger, in short, like 
the classical Greek philosophers, suggests that developing a theory 
of the good is more important than refining a prescription to 
maximize whatever results from that theory. It is the preoccupation 
of "moralities of desire," however conceived, with the latter refine-
ments that reverses cart and horse and contributes to the sense of 
moral skepticism. 
This focus on a theory of the good marks Unger's book as a rare 
contribution to contemporary Anglo-American philosophical litera-
ture; the skill with which the theory is developed makes it a valuable 
addition as well. One of the most remarkable characteristics of the 
book is its extreme breadth of vision. It encompasses in telling syn-
thesis a vast body of relevant but seemingly disparate sociological, 
philosophical, political, and psychological literature. On this level 
ironic that while Unger here protests against Kronman's oversimplification of his 
position, Unger's synthesis of the views of other thinkers in Knowledge and Politics 
is susceptible to similar criticism. . 
10. See J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 31, 54-194. 
11. See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26-53 (1974). 
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of broad synthesis, the discussion is rigorous and intellectually honest 
in the best scholarly tradition. The argument is coherent, tightly or-
ganized, and rich with connections and analogies among fundamental 
aspects of human experience and the insights of diverse, speculative 
thinkers. 
The discussion is also exceedingly abstract, although no more so 
perhaps than any philosophical treatise that examines the connec-
tions among ideas as basic as those that concern the nature of man, 
morals, and society. But unlike treatises that confine their analyses 
to "the order of ideas," Unger continually compares the theoretical 
order with "the order of social consciousness," giving life to abstract 
discussion by reference to experiences ranging from personal, 
romantic, and perverse love (pp. 218-19) to the philosopher's quest 
for ontological proofs of the existence of God (p. 293) . In each 
case, these brief discussions appear, not as diversions, but as integral, 
illuminating parts of the argument. 
At times, some of these same features make the book difficult 
reading. Unger assumes that the reader will be familiar with ab-
stract concepts whose content is not always clear even in the litera-
ture he surveys. There must, for example, be less obscure ways of 
describing the potential for harmonizing individualism and anti-
individualism than by suggesting "a synthesis of transcendence and 
immanence" as an "alternative conception of the emergent mentality" 
(pp. 180-81). Moreover, the brevity of the arguments and the ten-
dency to quick synthesis, particularly in comparison with the breadth 
of the themes treated, adds significantly to the effort needed to follow 
the argument. Finally, the style is infused with an air of such personal 
conviction and confidence in the analysis that it may prove an irri-
tant, preventing objective appraisal by those who believe that the in-
ability to find solutions to questions as basic as these should generate 
humility in even the most enlightened prophet. But these are minor 
problems. Compared to much of the current popular literature that 
appeals to "new consciousness" movements, Unger's book does a far 
better job of examining the theoretical structure of and the prospects 
for such anti-liberal movements. 
Despite its virtues, however, and despite Unger's candid confron-
tation, for the most part, of the assumptions on which his positive 
program depends, there remain some hidden assumptions that are 
crucial to the success of his project. One is that there is something 
wrong with antinomies. For Unger the inability to resolve these 
represents "the outer limits of our ability to escape tragedy in life" 
(p. 141). But tragedy, as the Greeks knew, can be the occasion as 
much for exhilaration and admiration "as for sorrow and pity. For 
Kant, the antinomies that set the bounds to reason also open up 
possibilities for hope and free will that otherwise remain in doubt. 
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For some contemporary philosophers who share Unger's view of the 
plight of man, the consequence is not despair but welcome recogni-
tion of the fact that man's inability to find authority makes faith 
possible and lends meaning to life precisely because contradiction 
and conflict are accepted as an inescapable part of the human pre-
dicament. 
Utopian theories have, after all, received a bad philosophical 
press of late, not so much or only because they are implausible, but 
because they do not appear necessarily preferable to nonutopian al-
tematives.12 Unger insists that his is not a plan for utopia, because 
utopias envision a static society isolated in history, whereas Unger 
contemplates continued reciprocal development of society and self 
through history (p. 237). But if the motivation for the establishment 
of organic groups is provided by an ideal that seeks complete resolu-
tion of uncertainty in the central aspects of human existence, then 
the recognition that only God can achieve the ideal perhaps should 
and will at some point eliminate the motivation. In Unger's terms, 
should one not consider whether agreement by many about the in-
evitability and the desirability or beauty of contradiction and conflict 
at these basic levels is evidence that human nature is better served 
by the acceptance of antinomies?13 
A second assumption is that Unger's positive program will in fact 
eliminate or lessen the antinomies of liberalism. Indeed, the most 
disappointing feature of the book is its failure to link the proposed 
solution to the problems which ostensibly give rise to the proposal. 
Consider the problem of adjudication, which for Unger arises out of 
"the antinomy of rules and values." Liberal theory reconciles free-
dom and order by positing impersonal rules whose impingement on 
individual liberty is justified because the rules are justified, either 
in direct substantive terms or on the basis of the procedures by which 
they are selected. But even assuming the rules can be thus justified 
(which Unger does not concede), they must still be applied. And 
adjudication under the premises of liberal political thought inevitably 
forces the law applier to impose his own subjective values, thus 
undermining the liberal justification for the restriction on liberty. 
Again, the problem is a familiar one, and again, Unger dispatches 
it quickly, dismissing in a few short paragraphs recent models of judi-
cial decisionmaking that purport to eliminate such discretionary 
judicial power.14 But Unger's suggestion that shared values and com-
mon ends might solve the problem because every decision could then 
be judged "according to its capacity to promote the common ends" 
12. See, e.g., Dahrendorf, Out of •Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological 
Analysis, 64 .AM. J. Soc. 115-27 (1958). 
13. Cf. R. NOZICK, supra note 11, at 297-334 (suggesting a "utopian" vision that 
emphasizes "individualism" to the point of near-extinction of "community"). 
14. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. -L. REv. 14 (1967). 
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(p. 101) assumes that such ends will be so specific that reasonable 
men could not disagree about which decision best promotes them. 
Because Unger makes no attempt to speculate about the shared 
values and common ends that will emerge from his positive program 
(see pp. 241, 245), the basis for this assumption is unclear. More-
over, even if consensus emerges with respect to some ends, others, 
even in organic groups, will remain outside the area of core agree-
ment-else there would be less need to lay such stress on the impor-
tance of the condition of democracy. But it is in part the condition 
of democracy in liberal society, forcing compromises among shifting 
minorities, which leads to the problem of adjudication in the first 
place, making the "purpose" of majority-selected ends inherently in-
determinate (seep. 95). Unger's program, in short, promises at best 
only to shift the problem of adjudication from the penumbra that sur-
rounds the contingently accepted values of present society to the 
penumbra surrounding the essentially shared values of organic 
groups. 
Similar problems confront the attempt to find in the positive pro-
gram a solution to the antinomy of reason and desire. Unger's criti-
cism of the morality of reason as an empty guide to conduct proves 
to be based less on his indictment of liberalism than on his view of 
the importance of practical or prudential, as opposed to theoreti-
cal, moral reasoning. Our ordinary moral concern to know what we 
ought to do in the case of concrete problems of choice requires in 
Unger's view a theory of practical reasoning that analogizes particu-
lars directly to each other, guiding moral choice by appeal to con-
crete examples of right conduct rather than to abstract rules or prin-
ciples. But Unger confesses, "I have no worked-out account of [prac-
tical reasoning] to offer, not because I believe such an account to be 
impossible or unimportant, but simply because I have not found one" 
(p. 258). Absent such an account, the problem of concrete moral· 
choice remains equally insoluble in organic groups. Conversely, 
with such an account (supplementing a morality either of reason or of 
desire) why should it not work as well in liberal society? Even if one 
supposes with Unger that practical moral judgments will prove "more 
secure" in organic groups, that is a long way from suggesting that the 
problem which formed a large part of the critique of liberalism will 
be solved by his positive program. 
In view of these considerations, and in view of Unger's own 
admission that, with or without liberalism, there may be "basic and 
ineradicable conflicts" in morals, knowledge, and politics (p. 141), 
one may well ask why one should "surrender the safeguards against 
evil that liberalism so painfully built" (pp. 247-48) in exchange for 
a program that offers little assurance of coming any closer to resolv-
ing such conflicts. One can find a better answer to this question 
in Unger's book than that provided by his focus on "antinomies." 
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The answer lies in Unger's description and analysis of those experi-
ences that individuals sometimes, if rarely, encounter in cases of 
aesthetic contemplation, personal love, and religious worship: delight 
in being and a sense of meaning that stubbornly resists and con-
founds the only meaning that liberalism offers. These remain in 
current society extraordinary experiences. The motivation for, and 
the measure of the success of, Unger's positive program lie in the 
promise it holds of extending the extraordinary into the everyday 
(see pp. 231-35). It is this possibility of achieving a community that 
is "the political analogue of personal love" (p. 220), rather than con-
cern about resolution of antinomies or conflict, that is more likely 
to justify attempts to realize Unger's social program. 
This conclusion has two consequences. First, it makes Unger's 
analysis of the value of and the pre-conditions for achieving greater 
social sympathy more important than his claim that liberalism is es-
sentially to blame for the failure to achieve such sympathy. Second, 
it tends to undermine that claim. One need not accept Unger's 
hypothesis of an objective species nature in order to accept his argu-
ments for the positive program. Indeed, the claim that liberal 
psychological premises leave the self with nothing necessarily in com-
mon with the rest of mankind proves itself false in one respect: under 
those premises, all men at least share in common the same inability to 
establish objective values. Why should not recognition of that com-
mon plight foster, rather than depress, natural human inclinations for 
sympathy and community? Liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith and 
Hume, after all, stress the value of sympathy and benevolence as vir-
tues to be cultivated, although Hume admits the natural feeling is 
a weak one.15 Liberals such as Rawls buttress the natural feeling 
with a theory designed to establish the rationality of principles of jus-
tice that are consistent, as we have seen, with an idea of community 
very similar to that explored by Unger.16 Other rational arguments 
for taking the "impersonal view" leading to empathy and altruism 
can be made without the aid of a theory of objective value.17 
Unger, in short, may be right that, if his theory of an objective species 
nature is correct and can be accepted, it will help motivate and make 
more stable the establishment of the positive program. But it would 
be a mistake to conclude from Unger's insistence on the "unity of 
liberal thought'' ( ch. 3) that one who is unable to escape from the 
"metaphysical prison house" (p. 229) of such thought is justified in 
thinking that Unger's social theory stands or falls with his moral 
theory. 
15. See, A. SMITII, THE THEoRY OF nm MORAL SENTIMENTS 1-30 (pt. I, § I, chs. 
I-IV) (1967); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 275-328, 455-70 (bk. II, 
pt. I; bk. III, pt. I, § I) (Selby-Bigge ed. 1888). 
16. See text at notes 3-4 supra. 
17. See T. NAGEL, THE PossmILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970). 
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AB for the moral theory itself, its plausibility depends on a final 
assumption in Unger's analysis that is not hidden at all but is explic-
itly confronted. It is the assumption that one can overcome two 
profound problems of circularity in the argument for the positive pro-
gram. Both arise from Unger's basic premises: human nature is 
the good (the only objective evaluative standard); human nature is 
whatever does not arise from domination; domination is unjustified 
power. Under this set of definitions it appears that to determine 
human nature one must already have an independent evaluative 
standard (apart from human nature) for distinguishing legitimate 
from illegitimate power. Unger's response is to suggest that the ap-
parent circle may be turned into a spiral. Advance is slow but 
advance does occur. Classical arguments in favor of slavery illus-
trate the difficulty of knowing where one is in the spiral or even 
whether one is proceeding in the right direction (pp. 244-45). But 
widely shared moral beliefs now reject the classical arguments. It 
is not, in short, hopeless to suggest that the justification of power 
is itself to be determined by widely shared 'beliefs capable of becom-
ing increasingly secure, though never final, with each advance. 
The second problem is that the entire program is futile from the 
outset if it should turn out that domination is itself a basic part of 
human nature. One may sympathize with Unger's reluctance to 
speculate about the shared values that human nature will reveal in 
a yet-to-be-established, domination-free society; but the assumption 
that such a society is possible at all already depends on a view of 
human nature yet to be established. It is an assumption that prefers 
Rousseau's view of man to Hobbes' and that rejects the view of man 
implicit in religious concepts of original sin and in scientific and an-
thropological theories that stress man's link to his animal origins. 
Unger's answer is simply to concede the assumption. The premise 
that underlies the entire enterprise is a belief in the ultimate 
harmony of being and goodness, truth and beauty-a belief that for 
Unger excludes the possibility that human nature might be inherently 
domination-seeking (see pp. 247-48). It is a view that links reason, 
fact, and value in a way that has strong adherents in the history of 
philosophy, beginning with Plato. Among contemporary American 
legal theorists it is a view that, in a different context, has been given 
lonely voice for some time in the writings of Professor Lon Fuller18 
and that shows signs of gaining modest support in recent analyses 
by other philosophers of the judicial process.19 
It is in this basic motivational premise of the undertaking that 
the ultimate value of Unger's book is to be found. Knowledge and 
18. See L. FuLLER, nm MORALITY OF LAw 159 (1969); L. Fuller, Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. RBv. 630 (1958). 
19. See R. SARTORIUS, INDIVIDUAL CoNDUCT AND SocIAL NORMS 169-73 (1975): 
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Politics does not advance inquiry into the questions, what can I know? 
and what ought I to do? It does advance inquiry into the question 
of Kant's Third Critique, "what may I hope?" Hope, by definition, 
entertains beliefs whose plausibility reason cannot establish. But 
hope must have some rational structure if it is not to degenerate into 
idle dreaming. Unger's entire essay is an attempt to provide such a 
structure. It is "an act of hope," pointing "toward a kind of thought 
and society that does not yet exist and may never exist'' (p. v). That 
it is a kind of society that could exist and is not simply the result 
of wishful thinking by those bent on the "quest for community" 
Unger, given his premise, demonstrates with passion and precision. 
Those who share his faith in the ultimate harmony of truth and good-
ness will find in Unger a powerful intellectual ally against those who 
claim such faith is blind. 
Philip Soper 
Associate Professor of Law 
The University of Michigan 
